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Introduction 
A traveler viewing Alsace today for the first time 
would never suspect the difficult and stormy past which has 
plagued this beautiful little country. The fertile plains, 
the vineyards, and the Vosges mountains on the French side 
of the Rhine are mirrored on the German side of the valley, 
extending to the mountains of the Black Forest. The cultures 
of these two great civilizations, too, mingle here, enrich 
and reflect each other. Language is a perfect example of 
this junction OI cultures. Most ihhabitants are at least 
bilingual, speaking both the local dialect, which is of 
Germanic origin, and either French or German. Many are tri­
lingual and speak all three languages with equal facility. 
The situation has seldom been so tranquil, however. 
Alsace and Lorraine have long been disputed between Prance 
and Germany. Prized for their location, which is crucial 
militarily, and for their natural cesources, the most impor­
tant being coal and lron, the two provinces have su££e~ed 
more than their share of invasions, seizures, and changes of 
government. As languages, customs, races, personalities, 
and governments mingle without necessarily integrating, the 
cultural pattern of the "parent" country lS reflected. A 
study of Alsace-Lorraine is thus a study of the interaction 
of the French and the Germans. 
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In this paper I hope to show a bit of this relationship 
b~tween France and Germany as the history of Alsace-Lorraine 
unfolds itself for analysis. The first chapter will briefly 
review the history of Alsace and Lorraine up to 1871. Origi­
nally provinces of the (German) Holy Roman Empire, Alsace 
and Lorraine gradually became French, both physically, through 
piecemeal acquisition of land by the French, and spiritually, 
mainly as a.result of the French Revolution of 1789. The 
second chapter will examine in depth the attitudes, ambitions, 
and justifications used by both nations prior to the annexa­
tion of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany in 1871. This period 
leads directly to the ,third chapter, in which we will analyze 
political and social developments in the Reichsland, or 
imperial territory, during the crucial period from tre Franco­
Prussian War to World War I--the time of German rule over a 
territory that had been decidedly pro-French. Though the new 
rulers of Alsace-Lorraine tried thcir best to Germanize the 
inhabitants, we will see that the success of the program, 
despite'its promising moments, was limited at best. In the 
end, the independent Alsatians and Lorrainers were returned 
to France, the mother country, where they continue to this 
day their celebration of their own unique culture. 
Chapter I 
To fully understand any portion of the history of Alsace­
Lorraine, it is necessary to have a basic understanding of 
her entire past. Thus it is the purpose of this chapter to 
set out in brief the development of this area and the forces 
which shaped it. 
Some common misconceptions persist about Alsace-Lorraine 
which need to be cleared up before we proceed. First of all, 
the idea of the "Alsace-Lorrainer" as a species must be 
scrapped. There is not now, nor has there ever been, any 
such person. Alsace and ,Lorraine were two separate and quite 
dissimilar provinces of pre-revolutionary France, with indi­
vidual backgrounds, traditions, physical attributes, and 
outlooks. Technically, neither has existed at all since the 
French Revolution in 1789, when Lorraine became the depart­
ments Meuse, Moselle, Meurthe-et-Moselle, and Vosges, and 
Alsace the departments Haut-Rhin and Bas-Rhin. The two 
provinces were first unified into the entity "Alsace-Lorraine" 
in 1871, after the Franco-Prussian War, when France ceded to 
Germany all of Alsace, except the free city Belfort, and most 
of Lorraine. Alsace-Lorraine prior to this time must conse­
quently be considered as her two components, Alsace and 
Lorraine. 
To quote the expert David Starr Jordan, "It is generally 
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recognized that the question of Alsace-Lorraine is mainly 
a question of Alsace."l In the majority of this paper we 
will be concerned with events and developments in Alsace; SOme 
background on Lorraine, however, is still necessary and appro­
. 2prlate. 
Lorraine, a former province of eastern France bounded on 
the north by Belgium and Luxembourg, on the north-east by 
West Germany, on the east by Alsace, on the west by Champagne, 
and on the south by Franche-Comte, first came into existence 
around A.D. 800 as a part of the Holy Roman Empire of Charlemagne. 
Prior to this time the area had been inhabited and governed 
by a succession of Celtic and Germanic tribes, by the Romans, 
and by the nomadic tribes during the Great Migration of Peoples 
in the fifth century. Charlmagne's son, Louis the Pious, 
succeeded his father but, without his strength and forceful 
personality, was unable to hold the empire together. Upon 
his death it was divided into three parts for three of his 
sons: Charles II (Charles the Bald) inherited the western 
section, which was to become France; Lewis the German received 
the eastern section, the future Germany; and to .Lothair, the 
eldest son, went the imperial crown and the middle section, 
which became known as Lotharingia. 
In 959 the duchy ","as divided into Lower and Upper Lotharin­
gia, with the ducal authority in the latter going to Frederick 
of Bar of the House of Ardennes, which held it until 1033. 
From 1033 to 1047, Upper Lotharingia was under the House of 
Verdun; it then passed to the lIouse of Alsace in 1048. During 
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, although the German 
I 
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duchies in Lower Lotharingia split into a swarm of principalities, 
Upper Lotharingia remained for the most part in the hands of 
its dukes, relatively solid and coherent. Politically, both 
Upper and Lower Lotha~ingia continued as part of the Holy 
Roman Empire, while culturally, French influence became more 
dominant undor the French kings Philip III (1270-85) and 
Philip IV (1285-1314) as the Holy ,Roman Empire weakened. 
Gradually the French began to exert political influence as 
well. In 1297 the city of-Metz was obtained by France; by 
1301, the area was half French; in 1444, Charles VIII of France 
invaded Lorraine and demanded authority as part of his cam­
paign to rebuild a strong monarchy in France. The Dukes of 
Lorraine and the Counts of Bar had become French as well as 
German princes back in the thirteenth century and as such 
took part in the destructive Hundred Years War between France 
and England (1337-1453). In the fifteenth century, Duke 
Charles the Bold of Burgundy made a play for power in Lorraine 
but was finally defeated by a joint Lorrainer-Swiss army 
early in 1477. Lorraine'retained its independence. The 
Reformation and the wars which followed increased the influence 
of the French kings. still moro during the sixteenth century. 
According to an agreement of August 26, 1552 (which was not 
ratified until 1561). the emperor Charles V, in desperate 
need of money. recognized the. virtual secession of Lorraine 
and Bar from the empire, while they agreed to pay a fixed 
amount of annual taxes. The sudden French conquest of Protes­
tant Germany led to the cession by the Germans of the bishoprics 
Metz, Toul, and Verdun to France at the Treaty of Chambord 
-
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of January, 1552. The French under their new king Henry II 
also occupied theoretically independent Lorraine and Luxembourg 
at the same-time. Though hostilities were renewed by Emperor 
Charles V of Germany, he was unable to regain any lost terri­
tory. It 15 this same conguest-oriented mentality which was 
to vindicate the Germans in their own eyes for their annexa­
tion of Alsace and Lorraine in 1871. 
Though Lorraine was still theoretically independent under 
her dukes, she was virtually controlled by France in the 
seventeenth century, as actions described above led to further 
acquisitions. The Treaty of Westphalia (1648), which ended 
the Thirty Years·War, confirmed the Treaty of Chambord and 
the concession of Metz, Toul, and Verdun. The French govern­
ment offered the Duke-of Lorraine impossible terms of peace 
and thus confirmed its true'· control over the territory. Parts 
of Lorraine occupied during the Thirty Years War in 1632 were 
evacuated by the French in 1661 only after more territorial 
concessions. The armies of Louis XIV occupied Lorraine once 
again in 1670.- The Treaty· of Ryswick in 1697 ended the War 
of the Grand Alliance between members of the League of Augsburg, 
consisting of the German Empire, Great Britain, the Netherlands, 
Spain and Sweden on the one hand, and Louis XIV of France on 
the other. Although France was not decisively defeated in 
this war, Louis XIV had to submit to the League's terms, and 
Lorraine was restored to its dukes, but only after more land 
was surrendered to France. 
The eighteenth century finally brought the definite 
acquisition of Lorraine by France. Duke Francis III of Lorraine 
9 
was engaged to the Austrian heiress Maria Theresa, when in 
1733 the War of the Polish Succession broke out between France 
and Austria. France immediately seized Lorraine. The peace 
settlement provided for the transfer of Lorraine and Bar to 
Stanislas Leszczynski, father-in-law of Louis XV, with the 
stipulation that the duchy pass to France upon his death, 
wh~ch occurred in 1766. 
As an integral part of France, Lorraine shared with her 
the problems and successes of democracy: the Revolution of 
1789, the revolutionary wars, Napoleon's rise and fall, the 
Restoration, and the Second Empire. After the Franco-Prussian 
War (1870), Lorraine was divided and relinquished in part to 
Germany. 
In the minds of many authors, and even in the mind of 
the French people, Alsace was the dominant character in the 
, 
forced union of Alsacc-Lorraine. David Starr Jordan quotes 
the Alsatians of 1914: "The French people mourn for Strasbourg 
rather than for Hetz.,,3 It was the statue representing 
Strasbourg, therefore Alsace, on the Place de la Concorde in 
Paris which was draped in mourning for over forty years, not 
the statue for Lorraine. It seems appropriate, then, to con­
sider the political and social development of Alsace in 
greater detail. 
The earliest known inhabitants of the area between the 
Rhine River and the Vosges, known today as Alsace, were 
Ligurians and, predominantly, Celts, near 2000 B.C. The 
five-hundred-year-long Roman domination of what they called 
Germania.superior brought along with its civilization the 
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longest period of peace which Alsace was to know--250 years. 4 
Subsequently invaded by the Alemanni, the Franks, the Sarmalians, 
the Burgundi, the Vandals, and the Huns,S Alsace experienced 
both the hardships and the advantages of being a fertile cross­
roads of continental Europe. 
The death in A.D. 869 of Emperor Lothair caused a struggle 
between the two grandsons of Charlemagne, Lewis the German and 
Charles the Bald of France, for possession of Lotharingia. 
The Treaty of Mersen settled the dispute in 870. Lotharingia 
was divided between France and Germany, and Alsace became a 
part of German Lotharingia. It was to remain a province of 
the Holy Roman Empire for eight hundred years. In the thir­
teenth century, with the fall of the ruling Hohenstaufen 
family, independent principalities developed in Lower Alsace, 
known as Nordgau, while Upper Alsace, or Sundgau, passed to 
the Hapsburg family. The Decapolis, the Union of Ten Free 
Cities, was established in 1354 in Nordgau, giving the 
Hapsburgs a slight measure of control there. Strasbourg 
became a republic under a bishop (at the suggestion of the 
emperor, Charles IV), while the League of Free Cities, under 
an imperial governor, controlled the rest of Nordgau for two 
hundred years, practically without external domination or 
influence. 
The Treaty of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years 
War in 1648, provided for compensations for the victorious 
French in- Alsace, though the terms were rather fuzzy. The 
ruling Hapsburgs of the German Empire relinquished their 
possessions in Sundgau but had only suzerainty to offer in 
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Nordgau. The Frene]1 king Louis XIV, however, pressed for 
territorial concessions and spent the remainder of his reign 
incorporating the rest of Alsace. From 1677 to 1680, his 
"chambers of reunion, ,. which consisted of selected French 
courts, declared his claims incontestable and annexed the free 
cities and. most Alsatian principalities. In 1681 Louis XIV 
seized ..Strasbourg, the only surviving imperial city. What 
little remained of free Alsuce finally fell to the French 
during the Revolution'and the reign of Napoleon. The Congress 
of Vienna confirmed these "last acquisitions in .1815. 
Alsace and Lorraine both experienced a cultural and poli­
tical renaissance in the eighteenth century.6 Authors of the 
Enlightenment such as the Frenchmen Montesquieu, Rousseau, 
Diderot, and Voltaire, the Germans Kant and Lessing, and the 
Americans Paine, Jefferson, and Franklin, expressed optimistic, 
bold, humane new ideas well-suited to the democratic, indepen­
dent spirit which had developed in Alsace. Their philosophies 
encouraged a rational, scientific approach to all areas of 
human endeavor, a secular view of the world, and a general 
sense of progress and perfectibility. The Alsatians had been 
well-prepared for the new ideas by their past: they had 
become practically autonomous while the German Emperor waged 
his wars. Most say the new regime was greeted enthusiastically 
in 1789. 7 Any disunity or opposition which might have sprung 
from the disadvantages of French trade laws, which went into 
effect after the Revolution, was quashed in 1792 with the 
outbreak of the revolutionary wars and their accompanying 
burst of patriotism. These wars grew in part from a problem 
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peculiar to Alsace: one-sixth of the province was still owned 
and governed by German princes who realized that the Revolu­
tion was a challenge to their dominance. S 
A factor which tied the Alsatians still closer in spirit 
to France was Napoleon's rise at the turn of the century. It 
can be said that the Revolution made Alsace French, while 
Napoleon cemented the political bonds. The liberal Alsatians 
supported Napoleon's rise because of his, liberal social poli­
cies and his Concordat with the Vatican of 1801. Although 
he put an end to democracy and republicanism, he continued 
unification (through wars) and social reforms. By 1815, when 
Napoleon suffered his famous defeat at Waterloo on June 18, 
the people had tired of his imperialistic wars. Prussia, at 
the Congress of Vienna (181S), pressed for the surrender of 
Alsace and Lorraine, but, fortunately, the other Allies 
resisted, knowing it would only lead to further hostilities. 
~7 The Prussinas did not abandon their hopes, however, and would 
'\1 -' 
make the same demands again in 1871. The loss of the Rhine 
frontier (including Cologne, Aix-la-Chapelle, and Treves) ~n 
1814 had deeply wounded the French pride, and the Allies realized 
that more demands might provoke another war. The Rheinischer 
Merkur, a liberal Alsatian paper, admitted that in 1815 the 
Alsatians talked of burning villages and emigrating with 
their cattle to avoid being subjected to the petty German 
despots. 9 ~vould fifty-six years greatly change their feelings 
toward the Germans? 
Th8 vacuum after Napoleon's fall was filled by the 
monarchy in the person of Louis XVIII. In 1830 the Bourbon 
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dynasty was restored, and Louis Philippe, Duke of Orleans, was 
chosen king. Though.the Bourbon Restoration was better received 
in Lorraine than in Alsace, it aroused at best lukewarm support. 
The "bourgeois monarchy" faced. pronounced Alsatian opposition, 
predominantly from merchants, factory OWners, and lawyers, 
who resisted the monarchy's repressive policies. 10 Protec­
tionist tariffs ultimately produced an economic slide, especially 
in Mulhouse, which was dependent on its export textile indus­
try. Financial and food crises plagued the land in IB16,and 
1817, and Strasbourg's Rhine traffic trade was devastated. 
"In the long run, the 'bourgeois monarchy' lost favor in 
Alsace because it ultimately failed to advance the interests 
of the local commercial and industrial magnates."ll 
Despite some dissatisfaction with the government, the 
Alsatians in 1848 enthusiastically celebrated the bicentennial 
of their annexation to France, 12 and the overthrow of Louis 
Philippe came as a surprise.13 In Alsace and Lorraine, rela­
tive calm prevailed in the vacuum between governments, and 
a smooth transition from monarchy to republican councils was 
achieved. 
Although little was happening within their own country 
to worry them, Bismarck's wars of 1864 and 1865 aroused alarm 
and apprehension in the Alsatians, who feared his next move-­
and they were not mistaken. Although Bismarck is often 
accused, and justly so, of having engineered the Franco-
Pruss ian War of 1870, both sides entered the dispute with high 
hopes for success and territorial gains. It was as if Alsace 
had been wagered, and France lost the bet. Fighting began 
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in early August of 1870 in northern Alsacei the French surren­
dered on September 2. 
In a larger sense, the Germans may have won this battle 
while losing a greater war. Their policy during the conflict 
of terrorization of civilians, intended to break Alsatian 
spirit, merely steeled their resolution. The bombardment of 
Strasbourg, in which 300· civilians were killed, 2000 injured, 
and 600 homes burned, did not endear ,the Germans to the natives. 
They could only watch while their beloved cathedral was damaged 
intentionally and without military justification. "Such was 
the first manifestation of the love of the Germans for their 
long-lost brothers.,,14 
Chapter II 
The two- or three-year period just prior to the annexation 
of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany is a very interesting one. An 
examination of the Alsatian and German attitudes of this time 
can shed some light on reactions and relationships which 
would develop during the period of the annexation itself. 
The Treaty of Frankfort of 1871 lays ,the foundation for the 
drama to be played out between France and Germany in Alsace-
Lorraine. Justificatio0s of the treaty (by the Germans) and 
reactions to it (by the Alsatians) will also be included in 
this chapter as further indications of the political and 
social temper which inaugurated the annexation. 
Alsace was hardly a social "Garden of Eden" in 1869. 
Political unrest and discontent with the government of Napoleon III 
were growlng, and religious, economic, and political schisms 
. 1 
were deepenlng. The dissatisfaction with Napoleon III sprung 
mainly from disagreement with his aggressive international 
policies. How could the Alsatians be expected to support a 
war in which their country was the pawn? The new republic, 
which replaced Napoleon III after he was taken prisoner by 
the Germans on September I, 1870, was greeted with hopes for 
a better-directed war, with a better chance of winning, or 
at the least, honorable peace negotiations. The tradidtional 
Catholic-Protestant antipathy in Alsace-Lorraine intensified. 
16 
Political divisions along religious lines were much stronger 
than usual in the last regular French parliamentary election 
in 1869. The anti-Catholic particularist movement gained 
momentum as war became imminent. The particularists proposed 
making Alsace a neutral state, theoretically independent of 
both Germany and France, but economically dependent on Germany. 
The particularists were pragmatists: they saw Germany's 
phenomenal economic development and sensed German victory in 
any war. And being anti-Catholic, they were also anti-Paris, 
that is, anti~French-government. But the particularists were 
far from popular with most Alsatians. The League of Alsace, 
a group.of unknown membership dedicated to stopping all 
Germanization of Alsace,~.branded all particularists traitors. 
The particularist defense? They were merely being practical, 
trying to gain political and economic concessions from the 
next ruler of Alsace. And economically, Alsace needed any 
scrap of aid. Alsace, especially the city of Mulhouse, was 
highly dependent on its textile industry, which was very 
closely held by a few wealthy, inbred families. There was 
almost no upward mobility into management, and the owners 
felt little sympathy toward the commoners who worked for them. 
In June of 1870, ·a 20% wage reduction in the form of higher 
rents--workers lived in factory-owned housing--caused a major 
labor strike, crippling the textile industry. Late that 
summer, war coupled with the effect of the strikes made pro­
duction impossible. Many Alsatians, appreciating the advan­
tages of a well-disciplined state, realized that only German 
authorities could revive the failing Alsatian economy and 
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avoid a social revolution. Thus the rift between the practical 
pro-Germans and the sentimental pro-French in Alsace deepened. 
The armistice agreement of January 29, 1871, provided 
for French elections to an assembly which would decide whether 
to continue the war, or the terms on which France would no2go­
tiate for peace. The election in Alsace-Lorraine could be 
viewed, then, as a plebescite on annexation. It would show 
the strength of the various groups described above, as the 
Alsatians went to the polls to choose their representatives. 
The election was scheduled for February 8, 1871. Though the 
Prussians did all in their power to discourage the voters, 
even announcing a false change of election date, only the 
results than actually existed. Leon Gambetta, the great French 
Reichstag elections of 1874 and 1887, for the German assembly, 
prompted a larger 2turnout. 
Many con~entators have concluded that there was greater 
pro-war, anti-German unity of sentiment shown in the election 
"
proponent of "war to the end!" did win a seat in all four 
departments ultimately ceded to Germany. In Bas-Rhin, however, 
Jules Favre, who advocated peace on honorable terms, that is, 
probable·annexation, received 54,514 votes to Gambetta's 
56,271. The department Haut-Rhin returned two anti-German 
delegates, one autonomist, and Frederick }]artmann, who was 
the first to be labled a traitor by the League of Alsace. 
German attitudes and ambitions, on the other hand, can 
best be judged by their actions prior to the Treaty of Frank­
fort, rather than by their opinions. The Germans, unlike the 
French, are not known for the lively vocal expression of any 
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and all emotions. Their reasoning was pragmatic, military, 
and conquest-oriented. Keep in mind that Germany at this 
time was, at best, a loose confederation of independent states 
fighting fiercely for ascendancy. They had little or no 
nationa-l sentiment. France, on the other hand, had been a 
nation .for close to a thousand years and had developed a 
nationalistic, sentimental way of thinking. They saw the 
potential 1055 of Alsace-Lorraine not as the unavoidable 
result of a military defeat, b~t as the ruthless mutilation of 
their homeland. This divergence 10 points of view is the 
underlying cause of the whole problem of Alsace-Lorraine. 
Germany's fundamental, overruling objective was military 
security. They felt that possession of the area west of the 
Rhine would protect tpem from French aggression. Nor was 
this a new notion. Prussia had pressed for the surrender of 
Alsace-Lorraine at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, and the 
demand had been a recurring political theme in Berlin S1nce 
the 1840 's'. Croym Prince Friedrich Wilhelm on August 14, 
1870, soon after the: outbreak of war, expressed a common 
sentiment when. he deemed it imperative to deprive Fran~e of 
some territory to ·kE.;ep her from disturbing the peace, but not 
necessarily to give the conquered territory to Prussia. 3 
General Heinrich von Trietschke put it bluntly: he said that 
even had the ~lsatians been Japanese, Germany.would have 
annexed them to capitalize on the military value of Metz and 
Strasbourg.~ 
The Germans had other motives for annexation aside from 
the military matters. First of all, despite the Catholic­
19 
Protestant schism, Alsace and Lorraine were 80% Catholic, which 
appealed very strongly to the Catholic South German states. 
Their eagerness to welcome new Catholics into the empire was 
more than religious conviction;'political gain was the goal. 
Secondly, Alsace and Lorraine_were very rich in natural resour­
ces, especially iron and coal. Because of economic trauma, 
the mines were not producing much in 1870, but the Germans 
had the technology and the determination to alter that situa­
tion. In 1913, for instance, of the 28,607,000 total tons 
of iron ore produced in Germany, 21,135,000 tons would come 
from Lorraine. S Finally, it has been suggested that the 
Germans feared the French Revolution and its democratic prin­
ciples. 6 Democracy posed a direct threat to German feudalism 
and absolute monarchy. By confiscating French territory, 
German rulers may have hoped to keep France and her dangerous 
democratic ideas under control. 
Once the Germans had decided that they needed Alsace-
Lorraine, two major decisions remained. First, how much 
should they annex? Second, what would they do with the terri­
tory once it was theirs? It was a foregone conclusion that 
Germany would annex practically all of Alsace. The logical 
objective in the decision of the amount of Lorraine taken was 
to maximize insurance against French aggression and at the 
same time to minimize the area of French-speaking Lorraine 
annexed. Many of the generals of the dominant military, 
however, were after revenge. They wanted to permanently 
cripple France, not just slow her down. General Gustav 
von Alvensleben, for example, advocated taking all of France 
~ 
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east of the Marne River, a territory at least twice the SlZC 
of Alsace-Lorraine. 7 Metz, an extremely French city in 
Lorraine, was a pivotal issue in the dispute. Bismarck him­
self did not want'Metz because he knew its annexation would 
only cause trouble and included it in the initial demands only 
as a point on which he could later compromise. But General 
Helmuth von Moltke emphasized its military value, equating 
its'possession with 120,000 troops. King Wilhelm wanted it. 
The generals wanted it. Finally Bismarck agreed to the inclu­
sion of Metz to avoid a falling-out with the military. With­
out Bismarck's moderating influence, Germany would probably 
have annexed far more territory.8 
Once the amount of territory to be included had been 
determined, the Germans still had to decide what to do with 
their new possession. There were several alternatives. 
Alsace-Lorraine could become a part of one of the existing 
German states. This practice was not at all uncommon--petty 
rulers were often rewarded for their loyalty (and their troops) 
with a present of part of the spoils of war. Prussia, the 
dominant state in the confederation, had the strongest claim, 
but all the South German liberals opposed that solution. 
Their suggestion was to give Alsace-Lorraine to Bavaria, the 
dominant South German state, but Prussia would have no part 
of that. Bavaria already seemed overly greedy, and their 
possession of Alsace-Lorraine would only increase the Bavarian­
Prussian rivalry. Perhaps Alsace-Lorraine could become a 
neutral buffer state? ~No, that could never work, either. The 
autonomists in Alsace were strong, but not strong enough to 
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overcome the pro-French faction. 'Alsace-Lorraine must remain 
under the legal control of Germany. Finally it was proposed 
that Alsace-Lorraine become a Reichsland, a federal possession 
belonging to all the states together. This satisfied liberals 
and conservatives, Prussians and Bavarians, Catholics and 
Protestants. Many even hoped that owning' common property 
would help unite the states into' a'great empire. Upon first 
thought, it may seem strange that the Germans did not consider 
making Alsacc-Lorraine a state of the empire equal to all the 
others. But the Germans did not yet trust the Alsatians enough 
to give them autonomy-~Reichsland status was supposedly a 
preparation for future statehood, which would never materialize. 
Frederick the Great, Germany's most illustrious national 
hero, once said: "Let us take; after that we shall always 
find lawyers enough to defend our rights.,,9 This was not the 
case with Alsace-Lorraine. Long before the Treaty of Frankfort 
was signed, or even. imagined ,German lawyers and thinkers 
were busy preparing justifications for their country's ambi­
tions. We have already examined Germany's motives; now let 
us inspect her defenses. Four basic justifications can be 
found, aside from the fact that the Germans were the victors 
and, as such, could do as they pleased: ethnology, linguistics, 
geography, and historical rights. .Unfortunately, none of 
them hold up very well under close scrutiny. 
Many skulls of the German dolichocephalic type were found 
ln Alsace-Lorraine. While the Germans pointed to this as 
evidence of their prior claim to the land, all it really proves 
is that the long-headed Germans immigrated among the round­
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headed eel ts. In any case, racial boundaries no longer deter­
mine national boundaries. France and Belgium, for instance, 
are of the same racial stem; Switzerland has within its bor- L-­
ders people of at least three distinct races. 
With their second point, linguistics, the Germans hoped 
to establish a more solid claim. It was undisputed that a 
majority of the Alsatians spoke German as their mother tongue. 
But if one-language-one-nation was to be the Germun philosophy, 
there remained some inconsistencies to be resolved. How could 
Prussia absorb Poles, Slavs, and Danes? And linguistics 
certainly did not justify the inclusion of Metz, a thoroughly 
French city, in the annexed territory. 
The geographic argument was that the Vosges mountains, 
the western border of Alsace, were the natural boundary 
between France and Germany. But why must it be the Vosges 
instead of, for instance, the .. Rhine River? Had the French 
won the war, the Germans certainly would not have agreed to 
relinquish th~ir territory.between the Rhine and the mountains 
of the Dlack Forest, an area symmetrical to Alsace. Nor were 
they consistent in the application of their principle. Much 
of the annexed portion of Lorraine lay west of the Vosges. 
Their f~nal argum~nt wasjthat Alsace and Lorraine had 
been German before they ,were French, and for a much longer 
time. The logic of this could also be disputed. The Holy 
Roman Empire was the Qredecessor of the German Empire which 
Bismarck hoped to build, but it was definitely not the same 
creature. And Alsace and.Lorraine had been loosely-held 
fringe possessions rather than whole-hearted participants in 
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the imperial grandeur. The (German) Holy Roman Empire, though 
it officially teld the territory for the longest, was noL Lhe 
original ruler. Perhaps Alsace and Lorraine should pass to 
the Italians, descendants of the Romans, who had an older 
claim than that of the Germans. But the Italians hac not 
won the Franco-Pruss~an war; the Germans had. The right of 
conquest, "to the victor go the spoils," was Germanyls real 
claim to hegemony. 
Legally, the Treaty of Frankfort of 1871 resolved the 
question. "Fra:).ce renounces. in [aver of the German Empire, 
all rights and titles to the territories situated east of 
the frontier designated below. The German Empire shall possess 
these territories forever, in full sovereignLy a.nd ownership. ,,10 
Although many respected Frenchmen urged the French govermnent 
not to sign, the Assembly of Bordeaux really had no alterna­
tive. They had to choose between "mutilation" and probable 
annihilation. So on ~lay 10, 1871, 1694 villages, towns, and 
cities, 1,S9"/,538 people, 5600 square miles--an area about the 
size of Connecticut and Rhode Island--were ceded by France to 
Germany "in full sovereignty and ownership. ,,11 
with the last flourish of the pen, the Germans considered 
the problem settled once and for all. Twenty years later, in 
1892"the Parisian newspaper Le Figaro asked the President 
of the Reichstag, Herr von Levct~ow, about the problem of 
Alsace-Lorrainc. His reply was as follows: 
In your letter of the twenty-fourth of last 
January, you wcr~ so kind as to honor me with a series 
of inquiries concerning the possibility of a peace­
ful solution to the "question of Alsace-Lorraine." 
24 
All these inquiries are answered by the provision 
of the first article of the peace preliminaries, 
confirmed by the treaty of May 10 , 1871, between 
France and the German Empire and according to which 
the regions designated as· the territory of Alsace­
Lorraine are ceded forever, in complete sovereignty 
and possession, to the German Empire. 
In referring to this clause of the treaty, I have 
the honor to beg you to accept the expression of 
my esteem.12 
For the Alsatians, on the other hand, the Treaty of 
Frankfort had posed a question, "not answered one. On February 17, 
1871, the representatives:to the National Assembly at Bordeaux 
from Alsace and Lorraine affirmed "the immutable will of 
Alsace and Lorraine to remain French," declared the settlement 
"a legitimate and permanent provocation to war," and stated, 
"We hold to be null and void every act and treaty, vote or 
plebescite, which would consent to the abandonment, in favor 
of the foreigner, of all or of any part of our provinces of 
li.lsace and Lorraine."l3 On March 14, 1871, they reiterated: 
"We declare once more null and void a compact which disposes 
. h 14of us w~t out our consent." Before the final decision to 
sign the treaty, the representatives of the two provinces 
staged an emotional walkout to express their disapproval. 
This may have been a spectacular display of sentiment, but it 
also left Alsace and Lorraine unrepresented in the final 
deliberations. 
Unfortunately, the German government accepted the pro­
tests at Bordeaux as an accurate gauge of the Alsatian mood. 
Certainly, the majority of the Alsatians still favored France, 
but conciliation was not as yct a lost cause. German officers 
stationed in Alsacc reported that many Alsatians welcomed 
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the chance to rid themselves of the repressive French irnperial 
government. The Germans, still insecure in their power, had 
two considerations to weigh: winning the sympathy of the new 
addition to their population. and their own national security. 
They felt that national defense could only be achieved by 
5upressing the democratic spirit of the people, depriving 
them of the rights to which they were accustomed. Thus began 
a struggle for respect and autonomy which lasted for forty­
seven years. 
Chapter :pI 
The only recurring motif for the events in the German 
Reichsland from 1871 to 1918 is suspicion. Confusion, misun­
derstanding, vacillation--these dominated German policies 10 
Alsace-Lorraine. The German attitude is itself marked by a 
fundamental contradiction: the insistence by the authorities 
that their "long-lost brothers" were Germans was incompatible 
with the policy of Germanization imposed upon them. David 
Starr Jordan cites a typical German response to an inquiry 
about Alsace-Lorraine: "There is no question of Alsace-
Lorraine: the land is German by tradition, by history, by 
language, by conquest, and by military necessity. Alsace-
Lorraine must be forced to resume the Teutonism her people 
had relinquished. "I If the people were so thoroughly German, 
what need was there to "Germanize" them? Though an anonymous 
German university student sees the Alsatian response a little 
more clearly, he maintains the same belief. "These people 
are Germans after all. Our professors tell us so. It is out 
of sheer perversity that they call trwmselves French. And 
yet, the more we cudgel them, the more French they claim to 
be and the less they like us.,,2 With such a crack in the 
foundation of their policy, it is little wonder that efforts 
to Germanize the Alsatians and Lorrainers, to incorporate 
them into the empire, were a failure. Seldom can an honest 
J!L
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effort at conciliation or a sincere COncern on the part of 
the government for the citizens of Alsace-Lorraine be discerned. 
Alsatian interests were consistently sacrificed to those of 
the Reich in all areas--political, military, and economic. 
The German authorities were convinced of the superiority of 
their imposed benefaction. As Trietschke affirmed. "We know 
better how to govern Alsace than the Alsatians know themselves."] 
And in 1871, despite protests from the democratically-minded 
Alsatians, the period of "superior" German rule began. 
The initial plan of "government was itself offensive to 
the· democratic, independent Alsatians. It divided the Reichs­
land into three "presidencies I" upper Alsace, Lower Alsace, 
and Lorraine. These in turn were divided into "circles," six 
in Upper Alsace and eight each in Lower Alsace and Lorraine. 
Each circle had its own Director. Supervising the entire 
Reichsland was a President-Superior, responsible only to the 
Kaiser. Being an imperial territory, not a state, Alsace-
Lorraine was entitled to no representatives in the federal 
legislature. On December 30, 1871, the famous--or infamous-­
Dictatorship" Article legalized arbitrary government in the 
Reichsland. "In the case of danger for the public safety, 
the President-Superior is authorized to take all measures 
which he may consider necessary to prevent this danger. He 
is, in particular, authorized to exercize, in the district 
threatened, the power conferred upon the military authorities 
in the case of the state of siege by the law of August 9, 1849." 
These military powers included the right-to search homes, 
remove offenders, order the surrender of arms, and forbid 
Jt
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d ' 4pubi " meet1ngs. Thus the President-superior was~catlons an 
empowered to callout all troops stationed in Alsace-Lorraine 
and-impose arbitrary rule whenever he deemed it "necessary." 
With this threat of authoritarianism hanging over them, 
the number of Alsatians and Lorrainers who choSE:! to exercise 
the only right granted them by the Treaty of Frankfort is not 
surprising. This right, Article Two of the treaty, was the 
citizenship option. "French citizens, born in the ceded terri­
tories, actually domiciled in the territory, who expect to 
preserve French citizenship, may do so, up to October 1, 1872, 
by means of a preliminary declaration made to the competent 
authority, and by means of transferring th~ir domicile to 
France and fixing it there, without this right being subject 
to alteration by laws of military service, in which case they 
will retain French citizenship. ,,5 There were, then, two parts 
to the option process: filing the option papers, and actual 
emigration. The League of Alsace ~ncouraged all citiz~ns to 
opt, to make their feelings known, but not to emigrate. They 
felt that Alsatians could best serve their country by remaining 
to protect her culture and fight for her interests. In Upper 
Alsace, the League's stronghold, 20% of the population (91,962 
people) filed options; in Lower Alsace, only 7% of the popula­
tion (39,190 people) opted; and in Lorraine, only 6% of the 
population (2B,639 people) filed the papers. The emigra tion 
statistics, however, were reversed. In Lorraine, 75% of the 
optants emigrated;in Lower Alsace, 29% of the optants left; 
6but in Upper Alsace, all but IB% of the optants remained. 
Of the 160,000 options filed, the Germans considered only 
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60,000 valid, because the remainder did not emigrate. The 
effect of -annexation on specific groups within the population 
is also interesting. Magistrates, for instance, were valuable 
to the new regime and were offered rewards in return for their 
continued cooperation. The Germans hoped to gain respect 
from the people and prove that "nothing had changed" in Alsace-
Lorraine by preserving the local jUdiciary. Unfortunately, 
all but six of the magistrates emigrated. Overall, 80% of the 
local governmental officials opted to preserve French citi­
zenship by leaving their homeland. Teachers had to weigh 
increased salaries and benefits against teaching the German 
version of history under German regulation. Charlemagne, for 
instance, was now known only as a German king. Many teachers 
. 7
also	 c hose to emlgrate. 
Embarrass8d by the mass emigration, President-Superior 
M~ller tried to make it more difficult for draft-aged minors 
to avoid German military service by going to France. On 
March 16, 1872, he declared that parents of minors had to opt 
as well for the children's options to be valid. This did not 
slow the mass draft evasion by the Alsatians. These men 
were not cowards; they simply did not wish to serve in the 
German army. Many of them, in fact, enlisted in the French 
army or the Foreign Legion. Neither the German policies of 
conciliation, such as better terms of service for the rich 
and the educated, nor coercion, prosecution of draft evaders, 
had much effect on the draft evasion rate, which was as high 
as 25% in 1879. 8 But the 75% of the draftees who served in 
the German army are not to be ignored. The German army, along 
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with the schools, was to be the primary instrument of Germani­
za tion. Its success, however, can be disputed. Alsatian 
soldiers, . considered too unreliable to serve in their sensitive 
homeland, were often sent to Prussia for their tours of 
, ,
duty. Accord1ng to Andre Hallays, many of these young men 
saw their task in doing their best in the Prussian army, and 
9in winning respect for themselves as Alsatians. Though others 
might serve in Prussia and become Germanized, says Hallays, 
they resumed their comfortable (superior) Alsatian ways upon 
10their return. 
The second important instrument of Germanization was the 
school system, and the Germans attacked this phase of the 
program with their usual zeal. ny August of 1870 they had 
already established administrative organs in the territory and 
were regulating education and religion as well as keeping 
order. Technically, they did not have the right to do this 
until after the Preliminary Peace of March 2, 1871, but many 
'ctered'It· 1egltlmate' as an act 0 fconSl ' war. 11 Religion, edu­
cation, and language were inextricably intertwined in Alsace-
Lorraine and will thus be discussed together. 
The Church had gained much control over education during 
the reign of Napoleon III, who realized that priests and nuns 
required much smaller salaries and were less expensive than 
secular teachers. The Germans maintained, however, that edu­
cation was a function of the state and uS8d the Concordat of 
1801, in a round-about way, to achieve their goal. The status 
of the Concordat, which was an agreement between Napoleon and 
the Pope, was uncertain in Alsace-Lorraine after the annexation. 
,\
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under Article Seventeen of the Concordat, non-Catholic rulers 
of France lost the right to appoint priests and bishops, but 
could negotiate with the Pope to regain this right. Since 
Emperor wilhelm I was neither French nor Catholi~. could he 
be granted the right to name priests by the Pope? Or was the 
whole Concordat invalid? An official decision was never reached. 
The Pope at first declared Article Seventeen invalid in Alsace-
Lorraine, which was meant to halt all govenment episcopal 
appointments. The Germans, however, interpreted this as an 
abrogation of the ent~re concordat and a license to regulate 
religion in the Reichsland as they pleased. The Pope quickly 
changed his mind. The result of all this vacillation was de /
facto recognition by both church and state of the Concordat 
of 1801. To the Church, it was a safeguard from arbitrary 
German legislation. To Berlin, it was a means to secular 
control of education. The Church controlled the schools; if 
the German government controlled episcopal appointments, it 
therefore controlled education. 
The first measures taken,by the Germans were to increase 
salaries of .teachers and to make attendance in elementary 
schools compulsory. Bismarck wanted to rid the school system 
of as many clerical instructors as possible. Jesuits, who 
were predominantly teachers, and some orders of nuns, were 
expelled from the Reich. Integration of sexes in some schools 
forced still more nuns to resign, because they wanted no part 
. f . . 12 
o f t h e promot~on 0 prom~scu~ty among youngsters. Not 
surprisingly, nerlin found itself with a severe shortage of 
teachers in nlsace-Lorraine, which led to some reversals of 
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the teaching restrictions. Beginning in 1875, nuns were allowed 
to take the required state examinations. In 1879, Field 
Marshal von Manteffcl, the new governor, continued the policy 
of religious and educational conciliation by allowing normal 
schools on a confessional basis, as well as schools segregated 
by sex, and by reopening the petits s&minaires, elementary 
schools fOr future priests, most of which had closed in the 
early 1870's. 
The language issue was closely tied to the educational 
system. Contrary to popular belief, the Germans never enacted 
blanket legislation suppressing the use of the French language. 
They understood that it would have been impossible to force 
·French-speaking adults to learn and use German; instead. they 
concentrated on school children. Time was on their side: by 
educating the youngest generation in the German language and 
ways, someday the whole Reichsland could be Germanized, physically, 
if not mentally. From 1871 to 1874, the teaching of French 
was prohibited in grade schools and all instruction was to be 
given in German. Nonetheless, many exceptions were allowed 
in areas where children needed to be bilingual. Though I:egu­
lations in secondary schools were stricter, French was still 
used. Language requirements in normal schools were flexible 
13
until" 1888. Due to differences in language patterns in 
the different parts of the Reichsland, Alsace and. Lorraine had 
to be considered separately. Most Alsatians spoke either 
German or the local German-based dialect; still, 20% of the 
population of the Reichsland claimed French as their native 
· l' ., f . 14tongue, pred om~nant y ~n Metz and otner sect~ons 0 LOrralne. 
1 
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Attempts to "fine-tune" language requirements, which began in 
1890, led only to complicated groupings, confusion, and dis­
IS
ruption of the educational system. 
Language requirements were more than an educational issue; 
they affected all areas of political and social life. From 
the time of the annexation, there was local agitation for 
instruction in French, as German had been taught under French 
rule. The Alsatians had convenien~ly forgotten the 1860's, 
when Napoleon III had made a vigorous, though unsuccessful, 
attempt to impose the French language upon German-speaking 
natives of Alsace. The German reverse program would not enjoy 
much more success. Though the ReicDsland 1 s national assembly 
(the Landesausschuss) repeatedly passed motions requiring 
mandatory French instruction, the German government, not 
bound by local legislation, kept hedging and making excuses, 
. 16
while fining or imprisoning agltators .. ,German was the offi­
cial language of business, of the courts, of the public. 
German street signs went up, except in Metz, where the signs 
were allowed to be bilingual. One law required all new shop 
signs to be in German~ storekeepers kept their Old, dilapidated 
(French) signs as a matter of pride. Liquidation Totale 
(Fren~h) was now Totale Liquidiation--by law. The usual incon­
sistencies were to be found even in the spiritual realm. Ser­
mons were allowed to be preached in French every ~unday in 
Mulhouse, but only th;ee times a month in colmar. 17 
German language requirements certainly had an effect on 
businesses in the Reichsland, but commerce and industry were 
more fundamentally -affected by ·the annexation itself and its 
1 
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accompanying tariff changes. Overall, German manufacturers 
tried'to thwart the integration of Alsace-Lorraine into their 
economic system, because integration meant competition. Alsatian 
-interests were sacrificed time and again to those of the federal 
states. Prospective programs for the Reich were tested using 
the conquered Reichsland as a guinea pig. 
Alsace-Lorraine in 1871 had two major industries, textiles 
and iron, and one major river port, at Strasbourg. 18 with 
the annexation, the Alsatian textile industry lost its French 
market, while the underdeveloped German industry gained poten­
tially dangerous competition. The South German manufacturers 
pressured Berlin to negotiate for low tariffs so that the 
Alsatians would not take over their markets. The Alsatian 
textile industry united, ignoring their differences for the 
moment, to make overtures on their own -behalf. !ligh French-
German tariffs would separate the sp1nning and weaving opera­
tions in Alsace from the finishing and dyeing operations in 
France. These efforts enjoyed limited success. The agreements 
provided for a transition period of two years, with gradually 
increasing tariffs until January I, 1873. This would not be 
the end of the troubles for the textile industry, however. 
The high French protectionist tariffs of 1890-1902, known as 
the M'line tariffs, also did tlleir share of damage. In 1892, 
the new Chancellor Caprivi negotiated trade agreements with 
neighboring countries, disregarding Alsatian interests. The 
one with Switzerland hurt the textile industry, while the 
agreement with Italy squeezed many of the Alsatian wine pro­
ducers out of their former markets. General European 
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depressions in the 1870's and 1890's were of no help. Alsatian 
industrialists who could afford to do so moved their operations 
to France, while others tried to accomodate themselves to the 
German market--a costly transition. Coarser materia15 were 
in demand in Germany, rather than the finer, more luxurious 
goods required for the French market, and modification of the 
equipment was expensive. Alsace-Lorraine lost considerable 
management, labor, and capital resources to France. An extreme 
case is the town of Bischwillcr, which in 1869 had a population 
of 11,500 and a labor force of 5000. By 1874 the population 
l~had fallen to 7700 and the labor force to 1800. The number 
of weaving machines went from 2000 in 1869 to only 650 in 1874. 
The Lorraine iron industry, though checked by the annexation, 
held up well under the transition. Until 1895, there was no 
competition between the Lorraine and Ruhr iron industries. 
Lorraine produced cast iron, while the Ruhr factories manu­
factured steel products. Z\ll concerned would have benefitted 
from a proposed Moselle River canal project, which would have 
facilitated lraue between the two areas. As the Lorraine 
industry developed, however, competition began and the project 
was dropped. The Rhineland coal and steel interests did not 
want steel products from Lorraine competing in their markets. 
The main conflict over the Rhine trade was between Strasbourg, 
in Alsace, and Mannheim, in Baden. The Rhine was quite navi­
gable through Mannhcim, but farther north, at Strasbourg, 
regulating the river, by dredging and riverbank inprovements, 
would increase trade appreciably. The authorities haggled 
over details for years. Work finally started in 1907, with 
36
 
Strasbourg and Alsace-Lorraine paying the majority of the 
costs. Strasbourg's position did improve: 1,988,310 tons of 
goods passed through the port in 1913, compared with 627,020 
tons in 1907. Just when the future looked bright for the ~~ 
Alsatians, however, the Germans opened a port at Kehl, directly 
across the river from Strasbourg, with superior railroad con­
nections. Once again, Alsace-Lorraine got the bad end of the 
deal, and economic integration was frustrated. Germanization 
was making no progress in the economic realm. 
Alsace-Lorraine was used as a testing ground for at 
least two unsuccessful federal programs. Alcoholism had 
become a major cause of death in Alsace after 1870. Excessive 
amounts of inferior liquor were being imported from southern 
Europe, because of tariff advantages, and being imbibed by 
the Alsatians. Government experiments with taxes and liquor 
license fee increases had no effect on the alcoholism rate 
and only served to irritate the population. The other ill­
starred government adventure concerned a federal tobacco mono­
poly similar to the one which already existed in France. The 
Strasbourg tobacco plant was already owned by the government, 
having simply passed from France to Germany with the Treaty 
of Frankfort. The Germans saw the healthy profit the French 
tobacco monopoly brought the government and wanted to try it 
themselves. The Strasbourg plant stockpiled huge amounts of 
tobacco products, especially cigars, in anticipation of an 
imminent; government takeover. But a major difference existed 
between the German and French situations. The French had 
- established their monopoly while the tobacco industry was still 
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undeveloped. The German government, on the other hand, could 
not afford the expropriation payments to its private entrepre­
neurs, and the monopoly bill was defeated in the Reichstag. 
This spelled disaster for the Strasbourg tobacco plant anll the 
Alsatian planters. Both the quality and the quantity of 
Alsatian tobacco declined from 1871 to 1918, because the indus­
try had no incentive to improve. 
Just as economic integration was fr~strated, so was poli­
tical integration of the Reichsland into the Reich, as an 
examination of laws, constitutions, and political developments 
will demonstrate. Alternating periods of coercion and con­
ciliation succeeded in alienating even the pro-German faction 
1n Alsace-Lorraine. 
The annexation started off with a period of ·repression. 
The Germans, justifiably insecure about their powers in the 
newly-won territory, wanted to make certain that the Alsatians 
and Lorrainers knew who was in charge. ~he Dictatorship Article 
of December 30, 1871, mentioned earlier in this chapter, is 
a prime example of their lack of confidence. Jnder international 
law, plenty of repressive legislation left over from the 
Napoleonic regimes was still valid in Alsnce-Lorraine. Actually, 
the hated Dicatorship Article merely duplicated existing 
·· 19 b .author~tar~an powers. It was, however, more 0 VlOUS to the 
public and caused popular agitation und general bad feelings. 
Even so, the Germa~s did not repeal it until 1902, during a 
period of concessions, because to do so would have been a sign 
of weak.ness. 
Authoritarian.government was not the only aspect of the 
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Pan-Germanist campaign. The Pan-Germanists were the ultra­
nationalists in Germany, whose ubjective in Alsace-Lorraine 
was to convince the government that more strictness was always 
cdlleu for. Because of the temperament of the people. they 
L-. 
felt that many "lois "d'exception." or Germanization laws, were 
necessary. Language regulations predominated, but many other 
areas were included. For instance, one law was passed sup­
pressing the Alsatian Society of r-techanical Construction, 
because its leader was a Frenchman. 20 In general, these laws 
were ignored and resented. As Paul 06rou!ede put it I liThe 
struggle against the French language is One of the most ridi­
culous aspects of the pan-germanist campaign. They 
would even germanize red skirts and blue skies.,,21 Resentment 
of the "lois d'exception" led to explicit rebellion and inten- L­
tional disregard of the laws. David Starr Jordan quotes an 
anonymous Alsatia~: "When the last Pan-germanist shall be put 
under the sod, on that very day ~lsace will find herself 
germanized as if by enchantment and with the best grace in the 
world.,,22 
The aspect of German rule most resented by the Alsatians 
was probably their loss of autonomy, of influence over their 
own destinies. This frustration was expressed by another un­
named Alsatian: "It is as easy to make the feelings of Alsace 
understood at Berlin as to inject by osmosis the essence of 
23
violet through the skin of a hippopotamus. 11 The Germans did 
indeed govern the Reichsland without input from its inhabi­
tants. Not until 1918, in a last-ditch effort to keep the 
area from being returned to France, did an Alsatian head the 
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territorial administration. To placate the people, beginning 
in 1874, Berlin granted Alsace-Lorraine several rights in the 
federal government. Never, however, were these rights abso­
lute, beca~se they were granted by the federal government and 
could have j~st as easily, if circumstances warranted, been 
withdrawn. As of January I, 1874, Alsace-Lorraine was entitled 
to fifteen representatives in the Reichstag, the lower house 
of the federal Jegislature. Laws concerning Alsace-Lorraine 
now needed the consent of the Rcichstag, rather than being 
er.acted solely by the emperor and the Bundesrat, the upper 
chamber of the leyislature. A Landesausschll!'>s, or local legis­
lature, was created to serve a~ advisory role--it might be 
consulted on legislation concerning Alsace-Lorrai:1€, when such 
consultation was cO:1venient. The Alsatians immediately elcc­
ted fifteen "protestaires," Slr protesters of annexation, to ~ 
represent theIT in the Reichstag. They obviously were not yel 
willing to be Gerrranizcd. 
On JUly 4, 1879, Alsace.-:'orrainc was granted a "Constitution." 
The Landesamischus5 was doubled in size and given the power 
to propose legisla~ion. They could not enact it, however; 
all legislation needed the approval of the Bundesrat. which 
, 
consisted of the German princes. The ~osition of Statthaltcr 
was crealed ,to replace the President-Superior, and the Statt­
halter was responsible only to the Kaiser. This "const.itution" 
represented a recognition of the, dissatisfaction, of the people, 
not a step toward self-government. NO rights were guaranteed. 
The first Statthalter was Field t-larsh.:ll von Manteuffel, who 
h<=lS be£n described as an "iron hand in a velvet glove.,,24 
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Manteuffel was a diplomat--experienced, friendly, courteous, 
well-liked--and a good choice for the job. He tried very 
hard to get to know the Alsatians and to reassure them about 
their new government. lie even used French in unofficial encoun­
ters. Much of the progress that he might have made, however, 
was nullified by his lower ministers, who sought to discredit 
him and gave him little support. Besides, Manteuffel was 
first of all a Pruss ian, and occasionally he had to enforce 
unpopular repressive legislation. Upon his deattl in June, 1885, 
the government could see no physical signs of the progress of 
Germanization and decided to change its tactics. 
Manteuffel's successor, Prince Chlodwig von Hohcnlohe­
Schillingsftirst, was cold and reserved, the embodiment of 
the government's irritation with the recalcitrant Reichsland. 
The period of greatest repression in Alsace-Lorraine was 
during Hohenlohe' s administra tion. "Increased militarism was 
becoming a way of life in Germany, as the country geared up 
for the wars to come. In 1887, the government tried to pass 
the notorious Law of the Septennate, which would provide for 
military appropriations for a period of seven years, thus 
deprlving the legislature of all control over the military. 
When the Reichstag protested, it was dissolved by Bismarck, 
who took the question to a referendum. Through violent cam­
paigning and exaggeration of the imminent danger of war, the 
military won its victory at the polls. Despite government 
success l.n the federal states, Stattha"l ter Hohenlohe' s attempts 
to use the war scare to gain cooperation in Alsace-Lorraine 
failed. The-Alsatians once again elected fifteen "protestaires" 
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to the ~eichstag. The "protestaires" received 82, 000 more 
25
votes in this election than in 1874. The Alsatians had 
obviously not learned their lesson, and Bismarck was more than 
happy to lend a hand with their discipline. A period of 
punishment and repression followed the election. Alsatian 
organizations were attacked and dissolved. No exclusion of 
Germans as members or use of French was allowed. The required 
use of passports for any non-German entering Alsace-Lorraine 
was enacted on June 1, 1888. No French military personnel 
were granted passports at all, and they were allowed only in 
exceptional cases for others. The official German doctrine 
was that it waS the French, not the Germans, who terrorized 
26Alsace with their peer pressure. The Germans were obviously 
doing the Alsatians a great service by cutting off all commu­
nication with the former homeland, though the Alsatians did 
not appreciate their efforts. There may have been other motives 
for the passport policy, as well. The new Chancellor Caprivi, 
who replaced Bismarck in 1890, said that the passports were 
effective as a means "to deepen the gulf which separated 
France from Germany.,,2? Statthalter Hohenlohe wrote in his 
memoirs on May 8, 1888, that the ulterior motive to the soon­
to-be-imposed passport system was to drive the Alsatians to 
28
revolt so that martial law could be enacted. Repression 
continued throughout the administration of 1I0he!1lohe, with 
the censorship of mail and newspapers. Finally the Germans 
were beginning to see some "progress," tangible effects of 
their repressive programs. The Alsatians and Lorrainers 
quieted their resentlnent. 
L 
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By 1894. when Hohenlohe-Schi llingsftlrst was made Chancellor, 
the Germans no longer felt threatened by the Alsatian insistence 
on autonomy and individual rights. Prince Hermann von Hohenlohe-
Langenburg was appointed Statthalter, and the government began 
making some concessions. They loosened the passport restric­
tions, then removed them altogether. Less censorship was 
enforced. Finally, in 1902, the despised Dictatorship Article 
of the Law of December 30, 1871, was repealed. The mood was 
right for reform. Allover Germany a self-consciousness was 
beginning to stir, a desire to end the autocratic rule of the 
Kaiser and give more power to the parliament and to the people. 
Germans started to question voting procedures. All of Germany 
elected its officials by a class voting system, with more 
weight rlaced upon the upper-class, educated portion of the 
electorate. Prussia did not even have a secret ballot. The 
people in general and the liberal political parties also 
demanded autonomy for Alsace-Lorraine, although this was very 
low on the government's list of priorities. The official 
government stance was that Alsace-Lorraine needed to prove 
i tse If "worthy," to meet some vague condi tions. Any reform 
in the Reichsland must be consistent with the security of th~ 
29Reich and strengthen Alsatian-German ties. Still, some 
action would have to be taken in the Reichsland. German ~mmi-
grants there were second-class citizens as well, and they 
were getting restless. The Alsatians had been restless for 
more than three decades. In the end, the general demand for 
reform was answered with minimal change. 
In 1907, Hohenlohe-Langenburg was replaced as Statthalter 
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by General Count Karl von Wedel, a very autocratic supporter 
of the Kaiser. Despite his conservative beliefs, Wedel knew 
that constitutional reform in Alsace-Lorraine was necessary 
for him to attain his political goals, and his public stance 
was that it was time for the Germans to show some trust in 
the Alsatians. In 1909, Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, a 
Prussian bureaucrat, was appointed Chancellor. Despite his 
cautious, conservative approach to reform. he, too, recog­
nized the need for change in Alsace-Lorraine. -On March 15, 
1910, he announced the government's agreement to a new consti­
tution for Alsace-Lorraine, and on April 30, even the emperor 
added his approval. Thus the way was cleared for reform-­
but the Landesausschuss, the Alsatian legislature, was not to 
be consulted as to the changes. The Alsatians still had not 
proved themselves worthy of the government's trust. 
The new Constitution of Alsace-Lorraine was upproved On 
May 26, 1911, by the Reichstag. The Landesausschuss was made 
bicameral, with the lower house to be elected by universal 
manhood sllffrage. The effects of these liberalized votirlg 
procedures were minimized by a three-year residence-require­
ment, plural voting based on age, and gerrymandering by the 
federal government. The upper chamber was cOntrolled by 
Berlin. The Landesausschuss was granted illusory budget 
power. If the Alsatian budget disagreed with the one desired 
by the German government, Berlin could still levy taxes and 
spend at will. Because the executive branch was still the 
German bureaucracy, the Landesausschuss had no means of 
enforcing its legislation. Alsace-Lorraine was granted three 
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votes in the upper chamber of the federal legislatJre, the 
Bundesrat, but they had to vote as the Statthalter directed, 
thus protecting the emperor's interests. Their votes were 
nullified, however, if Prussia thereby gainec a majority, thus 
protecting the interests of the other states. Consequently, 
the Alsatian voting right meant absolutely nothing. Limitations 
on the use of the French language were incluced in the consti­
tution. There was no assurance of permanence, because the 
constitution could be amended by the federal parliament, not 
by the LandesauGschuss. Most importantly, no mention was made 
of Alsace-~orraine's legal status. The Alsatians' one great 
desire, autonomy within the Reich, was ignored once again. 
Alsace-Lorraine remained a federal territory. 
The Constitution of 1911 understandably led to disillu­
sionment among the people of nlsace and Lorraine. It was 
followed by a government crackdown on malcontents, from 1911 
~ ~ . 
to 1914. hbbe'Wetter1e, the edltor of a Colmar paper, was 
fined and imprisoned for his protests. A merchant in Mulhouse 
was expelled fron.Alsace for requesting a hotel band to play 
the "r-tarseillaise. II Any merchant suspected of French sympathies L 
was persecuted by a boycott enforced by the government. The 
Alsdtian cartoonist 11ansi of Colmar was prosecuted for treason 
in 1914 because of a caricature of a Pan-Germanist high school 
30teacher. Despite the Alsatians' disenchantment and the 
government's impolitic response, t~e Constitution of 1911 led 
to a more national outlook in the Reichsland. In the first 
local election um]er the new law, in 1911, basically conservative, 
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clerical sentiments appeared. But the recently-formed Nationa!- ~ 
bund, a "party dedicated to protecting regional interests and 
to full autonomy and equality within the empire, suffered a 
31
crushing defeat. Any party, to be successful at the polls, 
had to advocate Alsatian natiunali~m in some form, but the 
government frowned upon this particularism. The Nationalbund 
was too radical, even for the Alsatians. In the 1912 parlia­
mentary elections, national issues outweighed the regional. 
War and peace, military budgeting, and foreign policy measures 
were important to the reapIe.32 The founding of the Mit Lel­
partei, a party which stressed a closer bond with the empire, 
and of a pro-German wing in the Alsace-Lorraine Ce~ter party, 
" , 0 f a f conCl'1' , ]] Th h ewere promlslng slgns uture latlon. en t 
progress of forty-two years was destroyed by the Zabern affair. 
nZabern (':Saverne in French) was a little town of 9000 
inhabitants in the Vosges foothills of northern A!sace, with 
no special distinction--until the autumn of 1913. A young 
German lieutenant, Baron von F~rstncr, displayed his immaturity 
in his relationships with the Alsatian troops under his command. 
He offered a ten-mark prize to anyone to "stick" any Alsatian 
who might "assault" him. When he went out to buy chocolate, 
he had himself guardeci. by four soldiers with bayonets. In 
general, he behaved in a ridiculous and belligerent manner, 
dod was mocked by the people for his childishness. Ilis comman­
ding officer, Colonel von Reutter, supported him and took the 
law into his own hands. He prepared for a seige, stationed 
soldiers with machine quns on street corners, and initiated 
arbitrary,: arrests. People were arrested for laughing, for 
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not moving, for moving too quickly. On November 25. the Reichs­
tag debated the problem of Zabern and later passed a motion 
censuring Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg for his lack of response. 
For the first time, a question of Alsace concerned all of 
Germany. The Minister of War, General von Falkenhayn, pronounced 
that F~rstner's actions were not insults because he did not 
know that "his words would become known to the pUblic.,,34 The 
ignominious treatment of citi2ens continued. On December 2, 
F~rstner attacked a civilian group, who allegedly laughed at 
him, and severely injured a lame cobbler. The cobbler had
 
shown "disrespect" and protested his innocence, and as his
 
punishment, F~rstner slashed him in the forehead with his sword,
 
while soldiers held him still. Several townspeople, including
 
thrce jUdges of the civil tribunal, were arrested one evening
 
on their way home and held overnight at the military jail.
 
Testimony given at the session of the Higher court-Martial at
 
Strasbourg, which began on January 5, 1914. is informative.
 
A Lieutenant Schadt's justification for arresting the judges
 
of the civil tribunal was as follows:
 
The public prosecutor was particularly provocative. 
One of the judges said to me, "I wi 11 take no orders 
from you." Naturally I arrested him. I had every 
man whom I suspected of laughing at us arrested. 
As they were too cowardly to do it to our faces one 
had to be guided by presumption. We were obliged to 
break into some houses to catch the delinquents. 35 
The Court-Martial acquitted Schadt on the grounds that he was 
obeying orders. Reutter, the commanding officer, was acquitted 
because he was innocent of the intent to violate the law. And 
F~rstner was acquitted because.he had exercised his right of 
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"p'.J.oitivc sclf-dcfense"--the cobbler was carrying a pocket 
knife in his pocket. Count Kurl von Wedel, the Statthalter, 
and many of the local officials resig~ed. 
The Zabern affair was an unquestionable victory for the 
military caste in Germany. The army belonged to the Kaiser, 
and the Kaiser was sovereign. The civil authority, repre­
sentell in the Heich by Oethmann-llollweg and in the Reichsland 
by Wedel, was powerless in comparison. Bethmann-Hollweg did 
not handle the affair as the parliament would have liked, and 
thus received a vote of no confidence, but there was little 
else he could do. Alsace was still a conquered province, no 
different than in 1871. The lack of respect shown the people 
of Alsace and Lorraine indicates how t~ose in power regarded 
their "long-lost brothers" after forty-two years. 
i I, 
, 
Concll,lsion 
no. 
from 
Did Germanization make any progress in Alsace-Lorraine 
. . 
The underlying Alsatian spirit was not altered by German 
1871 to 1918? On the surface, perhaps;, fundamentally, 
laws and policies. Repression interspersed with conciliation 
"Current" 
led ~nly 
. . 
doggerel of 1913 expressed the Alsatians' 
to distrust and suspicion, not to improved 
sentiments: 
relations. 
"Franl5ais 
Prussien 
Alsacien 
ne peux, 
ne veux, 
~uis.'·l 
"French I 
Prussian 
Alsatian 
can't be, 
I won't be, 
I am." 
Li'irst and foremost, an Alsatian considers himself Als·atian. 
And he considers all Alsatians Frenchmen, no matter what ·the 
Forty-seven years under German rule did certainly change 
native tongue. 
the Alsatian way of life. Many Alsatians would have preferred 
autonomy in 1919 to a reunion with France. 2 And the subsequent 
, 
reunification posed difficulties for much of the population. 
German immigrants and Alsatians who had·grown up under the 
German regime suffered the same problems of adaptation as the 
French citizens of Alsace and Lorraine tlad experienced in 1871.
 
Many Alsatian Germans held on to their loyalty to their German
 
•homeland: 18,000 Alsatians died for Germany in the second 
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1­

3World war. But when the Germans occupied Alsace again during . ....(~
 
World War II, their efforts at Germanization were just as
 
unsuccessful as during the- 1871-1918 annexation.
 
How successful did the people of that time consider the 
German attempts? Count von Caprlvi, who in 1890 would become 
Chancellor, admitted in 1888, "It is a fact that after seven­
teen years of annexation, the German spirit has made no pro­
gress in Alsacc.,,4 Jacques Preiss, a representative to the 
Reichstag and leader of "Young l\lsace," in 1896 elaborated on 
the same idea: 
Gentlemen, the people of Alsace-Lorraine protested
, in 1871. They protested through their representatives, 
specially elected Eor that prupose, against the 
annexation to Germany. This protest has not been 
withdrawn since, either in law, or in fact. 
The assimilation, the Germanization of the country 
has not advanced a step to this day. Fear 
poisons our political existence. The Government 
does not understand the people, and the people do 
not understand the Government. History will 
say: "The German Empire succeeded in conquering 
Alsace-Lorriane materially, but its administration 
did not know how to conquer her morallYI did not 
know how to win the heart and soul of the people. liS 
Neither the governors nor the governed considered the German­
ization program a success. The attempts were neither systematic 
nor enduring, and the results satisfied no-one. The.Zabern 
affair was the final insult for both the Alsatians and the 
German civilian government. It demonstrated the attitude of 
the true rulers of Alsace, the military: the Alsatians were 
conquered people, unworthy of equality or even of respect. 
Germanization had not made much progress among the military 
rulers either. 
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We will, of course, never know what might have happe~ed 
if_war had not broken out in 1914. The Germans could have 
contin~ed their policies, while time did its work, changing 
the outlook and cha=acter of the people. But why were the 
attempts which were made so unsuccessf~l? Prince Alexander, 
son of Statthalter ~ohenlohe-Schillingsftlrst, theorized that 
the conquered provi~ces could successfully have been governed 
in three different ways--none of which were adopted by the 
qovernrnent. First, Alsace and Lorraine could have been parti­
tioned among the existing federal states. I~ this way the 
Alsatians would have been full German citizens, while there 
would have been little need to worry about a dangerous revolt. 
Second, 'Alsn~~-Lorraine could have been made an equal federal 
state within the errpirc. Militarily, the Gernlans felt too 
insecure to enact this option, as was discussed in Chapter II. 
The third solutiOn would have been to express a genuine respect 
for the needs and desires of the Als~tians.6 In Chapter III 
we saw how the Germans actually treated the Alsatians: as 
guined plg~, as a military necessity, as a vanqui~hpd n~tion. 
As David Starr Jordan points out, a Franco-German understanding 
would have alleviated much of ,the tension, because friendliness 
to one nation would not tave been treachery to the other. 7 No 
such understanding was achievec1 UJllil much later, ufter 
World War II. 
The Alsace of today, though typically :f.r-encb, is very 
proud of :its own culture: its languaqe, its legends, and its 
traditions. When I asked a woman from Strasbourg about the 
French influence on Alsacc, shc responded emphatically, in 
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{ ~ r ~r. '1\ 
French, that one cannot speak of the French influence on Alsace, 
because the latter is itself French. Even during the period 
of German domination, the nlsatians tho~ght and acted as 
Frenchmen, though they expressed themselves in German. 8 Ger­
manization of Alsace-Lorraine, a very complex concept, was a 
simple failure. No trace of the German efforts remains today. 
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